The Hindu Gist - 22nd October, 2026
1 . Peace for Progress
Regional economic cooperation cannot succeed if member states disagree on the security threats undermining it. India’s position at the SCO is that counterterrorism must be treated as a prerequisite for regional integration, not as a separate diplomatic issue. Following the Pahalgam terror attack and Operation Sindoor, India objected to a draft declaration that did not adequately reflect its concerns over cross-border and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The presence of Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar sharpened this diplomatic divide, exposing the difficulty of building regional consensus when members differ over the nature of the threat itself.
This disagreement has implications beyond counterterrorism. Initiatives such as the International North–South Transport Corridor and Chabahar Port are intended to improve access to Central Asian markets, but connectivity delivers economic benefits only when security, investor confidence and predictable transport networks are in place. The contradiction facing the SCO is that it seeks deeper economic cooperation without a common approach to the security conditions needed to sustain it. India’s position is that progress requires practical cooperation against terrorism, including intelligence-sharing, disruption of recruitment networks and terrorist financing, while respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2. Bitter and Sweet: The FSSAI Must Expand Restrictions to Cover All Added Sugars in Infant Foods
The FSSAI’s expansion of restrictions on added sugars in infant foods highlights a tension between nutritional safeguards and the commercial formulations of infant-food manufacturers.
Regulation of Added Sugars in Infant Foods
- Existing restrictions: Under the 2020 regulations, sucrose and/or fructose may be added to infant nutrition products when required as a carbohydrate source, provided their combined amount does not exceed 20% of total carbohydrate. The 2026 draft proposes prohibiting their addition in products intended for infants up to six months.
- Proposed amendment and regulatory gap: The draft amendment prohibits added sucrose and fructose in products for infants up to six months. The editorial argues that restrictions should cover all added sugars and extend to products for older infants, rather than targeting only two ingredients.
- Nutritional implications: WHO recommendations and infant-feeding guidelines emphasise avoiding added sugars. Evidence cited in the discussion links regular exposure to sweetened foods during infancy with a greater preference for sweet flavours and potential adverse dietary patterns.
- Regulatory loophole: The concern is that restrictions focused on sucrose and fructose may leave room for manufacturers to use other sweetening ingredients. The regulatory framework therefore needs to cover all added sugars rather than only selected ingredients.
- Industry and enforcement: Manufacturers have defended sugar formulations under the Food Safety and Standards Act and the Codex Alimentarius framework. The key challenge is ensuring that product formulations and labelling requirements align with nutritional objectives.
- Way forward: The FSSAI should assess the ingredients used in infant foods and the nutritional profile of finished products, ensuring that restrictions apply comprehensively to added sugars. The proposed framework should also address products intended for infants beyond six months, where exposure to sweetened foods can influence longer-term dietary preferences.
3. How Exposed Is India to Foreign Technology?
Elon Musk’s reported restrictions on Ukraine’s access to military-grade Starshield services, which rely on SpaceX’s satellite infrastructure, highlight how dependence on foreign-controlled technology can become a strategic vulnerability during geopolitical conflicts. India’s reliance extends across satellite communications, navigation, cloud computing, digital payments and military equipment. The central concern is the difference between accessing technology and retaining control over its continued operation when foreign providers, export restrictions or sanctions disrupt essential services.
Foreign Dependence Across Critical Sectors
- Satellite communications: Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb and Jio Satellite Communications illustrate India’s reliance on satellite-service providers with different ownership structures. Government investment in Jio and foreign links involving OneWeb do not automatically guarantee control over all network infrastructure. Starlink’s restrictions in Ukraine highlight the risks of dependence on external providers.
- Satellite navigation: NavIC was designed as a seven-satellite constellation, but at least four operational satellites are required for basic positioning. As of July 2026, only three satellites were available for positioning, navigation and timing, preventing standalone positioning; timing services remained functional.
- Cloud computing: MeghRaj 2.0 includes an AWS–Yotta hybrid-cloud collaboration announced in February 2026. Sensitive workloads can remain within NIC data centres while using AWS services, raising questions about operational dependence even where data residency requirements are met.
- Digital payments: Although UPI supports domestic transactions, international payments remain connected to foreign financial institutions and cross-border banking infrastructure. The European Union’s disconnection of selected Russian banks from SWIFT illustrates how sanctions can disrupt international financial communication and potentially affect Indian businesses.
- Military equipment: Following India’s 1998 nuclear tests, US sanctions disrupted defence procurement, including the non-delivery of US-made engines intended for the Advanced Light Helicopter programme.
Domestic Alternatives and the Limits of Technological Control
- Data localisation versus operational control: Physically storing data in India does not necessarily provide independence if foreign companies control the cloud infrastructure, software or management systems required to operate it.
- Indigenous software: Maya OS, developed under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, represents an effort to reduce reliance on proprietary foreign operating systems. However, alternatives must meet practical security and operational requirements to be viable at scale.
- Navigation and communications: NavIC and domestic satellite capabilities can reduce reliance on foreign systems, but their strategic value depends on adequate coverage, operational reliability and the ability to maintain and expand infrastructure.
- Financial and defence vulnerabilities: Dependence on international payment networks and overseas defence suppliers can expose India to external decisions even when domestic institutions remain operational.
Strengthening Strategic Autonomy
- Operational resilience: India needs the ability to maintain essential services when foreign providers restrict access or international tensions disrupt supplies.
- Credible domestic capability: Indigenous systems must be capable of operating at scale, with sufficient infrastructure, maintenance capacity and technical support.
- Diversification: Reducing excessive dependence on individual providers can limit the impact of sanctions, commercial decisions and geopolitical disruptions.
- End-to-end control: Strategic autonomy requires more than domestic ownership or data storage; it requires the capacity to operate, maintain and, where necessary, replace critical systems independently.
The Indian Express Gist - 22nd October, 2026
1 . Let’s Recreate the UN — 81 Years Show Why It’s Worth the Effort
As the United Nations (UN) marks its 81st anniversary, it faces a crisis of legitimacy amid geopolitical rivalry, armed conflicts and weakening confidence in multilateral institutions. Despite its limitations, the UN has contributed to humanitarian assistance, global health, development and international cooperation. The central argument is that the UN needs institutional renewal, not abandonment, because the alternatives to multilateral cooperation could further weaken international order and collective responses to global challenges.
The UN’s Legacy: Achievements and Changing Global Realities
- Humanitarian and developmental achievements: UN agencies have contributed to improvements in public health, education and poverty reduction. The World Health Organization (WHO) helped support the decline in global child mortality, while UNICEF has played a major role in protecting children and supporting vulnerable populations.
- Multilateral treaty-making: The Montreal Protocol, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Paris Agreement demonstrate the UN system’s role in establishing international standards and coordinating action on shared challenges.
- Humanitarian response: The UN has supported displaced populations, including through refugee assistance and disaster relief. Its humanitarian role remains particularly important during conflicts and large-scale emergencies.
- Peacekeeping and conflict management: UN peacekeeping and diplomatic initiatives have contributed to conflict management, although their effectiveness depends on the cooperation of member states and the political circumstances of each conflict.
- A transformed international order: Decolonisation, the emergence of new powers and the growing influence of regional actors have changed global politics since the UN’s establishment. Institutions created in the aftermath of the Second World War must now operate in a world with a substantially different distribution of power.
The UN’s Legitimacy Crisis: Representation, Veto and Geopolitical Rivalry
- Outdated power structure: The Security Council’s permanent membership reflects the geopolitical settlement of 1945 rather than contemporary global realities. This raises questions about the representation of developing countries and emerging powers.
- Veto-induced paralysis: The veto allows permanent members to block substantive Security Council decisions, even when international crises demand collective action. The resulting paralysis weakens confidence in the UN’s ability to uphold international peace and security.
- Geopolitical competition: Rivalries among major powers increasingly constrain international cooperation. The UN’s capacity to respond depends not only on its institutional design but also on whether influential states are willing to support collective action.
- Erosion of international legitimacy: When international rules are applied inconsistently or powerful states can obstruct action, the credibility of multilateral institutions suffers. This deepens the gap between the UN’s founding principles and its practical performance.
- Limits of institutional authority: The UN cannot independently resolve conflicts when powerful states refuse to cooperate. Its authority is therefore inseparable from the political commitment of its members.
Reforming the UN: From Institutional Change to Effective Multilateralism
- More representative decision-making: Security Council reform must address the under-representation of developing countries and reflect changes in global political and economic power.
- Addressing the veto: Reform must confront the tension between the privileges of permanent members and the need for effective collective responses to international crises.
- Restoring confidence in multilateralism: The UN’s legitimacy depends on its ability to respond consistently to conflicts, humanitarian emergencies and transnational challenges rather than allowing geopolitical rivalry to dominate institutional action.
- Preserving the value of collective action: Weaknesses in the UN do not negate the need for an international forum where states can negotiate, coordinate policies and establish common rules. Abandoning multilateral institutions could leave global challenges more vulnerable to unilateral decisions and power politics.
2. Six Steps to Strengthen the India–US Relationship
The India–US partnership is facing uncertainty despite shared concerns over China and progress in defence cooperation. Differences over India’s engagement with Russia and Pakistan, alongside Washington’s changing strategic priorities, have created friction. The challenge is to move beyond diplomatic declarations and build a pragmatic, interest-driven alignment through concrete cooperation in deterrence, defence production, technology and regional security.
From Strategic Alignment to Operational Cooperation
- Reciprocal deterrence: India should strengthen its Pacific presence, building on the Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet forward deployments to Southeast Asia and coordinated patrols in the Philippine Sea. The US should correspondingly expand its naval presence and logistical access in the Indian Ocean.
- Indian Ocean cooperation: Greater US naval presence in the Indian Ocean, including joint patrols and expanded regional logistics, can strengthen India’s maritime security.
- Logistical interoperability: Existing logistics pacts should be operationalised to support forward-deployed US naval assets, alongside the development of deep-sea sensor networks.
- Institutionalised military coordination: A joint framework for protecting critical energy grids and satellite networks against cyberattacks should complement cooperation in high-technology friction points. The proposals also include a Joint Space Defence Command to develop small military satellites.
From Defence Acquisition to Co-production and Industrial Capacity
- Make in India and reciprocal procurement: Defence acquisition should move beyond purchasing foreign equipment towards partnerships that strengthen Indian manufacturing. Proposals include domestic assembly of long-range drones and co-production of jet engines.
- Joint development: These arrangements should create pathways for future co-development of precision-strike munitions and autonomous systems, strengthening indigenous defence capabilities.
- Defence acceleration ecosystem: Venture-capital pipelines should be expanded to help commercialise dual-use startup innovations before they become trapped in traditional military procurement processes.
- Semiconductor and critical-mineral security: Leveraging its membership of the US-led Pax Silica coalition could help India accelerate its domestic semiconductor ecosystem. Predictable export controls and access to trusted AI infrastructure remain important.
- Critical minerals framework: Implementing the bilateral Critical Minerals Framework, alongside public–private capital, can support rare-earth processing and lithium refining while addressing commercial and market-access barriers.
Wider Strategic Partnerships and People-to-People Links
- Indo-Pacific integration: India and the US should connect bilateral logistics and surveillance capabilities with broader regional frameworks, including the Quad and operational partnerships with countries such as the Philippines.
- Security beyond bilateral ties: Integrating bilateral cooperation into wider groupings can help translate individual partnerships into collective deterrence across the Indo-Pacific.
- Diaspora and educational networks: Bilateral fellowships and cross-regional scholarships involving Indo-Pacific partners can strengthen professional networks and provide a commercial foundation for the wider alliance.
- Managing strategic differences: The relationship need not be frictionless. India’s engagement with Russia and its regional relationships should be managed through pragmatic alignment rather than expectations of complete convergence.
The central argument is that India–US relations should be built on mutually beneficial, operational cooperation rather than declarations of strategic convergence alone.
