UPSC Current Affairs for 24ᵗʰ September 2026

I) The Hindu Gist 1. Deep Rot: SIR and the Need for Electoral-Roll Accountability 2. Trading Smart: India–New Zealand FTA II) The Indian Express Gist 1. Tulu’s ‘Official’ Tag in Karnataka: What It Means 2. EC Appointment: Why the Supreme Court Placed the Matter Before a Constitution Bench 3. Chief Election Commissioner Is Not the Election Commission of India......

The Hindu Gist - 24th September, 2026

1 . Deep Rot: SIR and the Need for Electoral-Roll Accountability

The concerns surrounding the ECI’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) extend beyond individual deletions to the functioning of the electoral-roll database and decision-making process. The central issue is whether the design of SIR places the burden of proving eligibility on citizens instead of ensuring verification by the electoral machinery.

Institutional and Procedural Concerns
  1. Centralisation of electoral rolls — The ECI reportedly sought an audit after field officials were found to have limited access to the National Electoral Roll Portal, reflecting concerns that changes to voter records were being made centrally, overriding Electoral Registration Officers who are the statutory authority on voter eligibility.
  2. Unexplained alterations — The process reportedly involved repeated changes in electoral records without adequate knowledge of local election officials, raising questions about accountability and traceability in the electoral database.
  3. Form 6 controversy — Questions were raised over whether applicants or their parents/grandparents appeared in the electoral roll of the last SIR. The ECI had earlier maintained that Form 6, used for new electors, could not be altered without changing the rules, yet the revised form contained such questions.
  4. Need for institutional accountability — The disagreement among Election Commissioners over the SIR reflects deeper concerns about who authorised changes and how decisions affecting electoral eligibility are recorded and reviewed.
Mass Deletions and the Risk to Universal Adult Franchise
  1. Large-scale exclusions — Around 60 lakh electors in West Bengal were flagged for “logical discrepancies”, with 27 lakh names deleted. Of more than 38 lakh appeals pending before tribunals, 16.1 lakh were challenges against inclusion, while over nine in ten decided appeals resulted in restoration of the elector.
  2. Deletion before verification — The central concern is that SIR deletes electors before adequately verifying their eligibility, thereby shifting the burden of proof from the electoral authority to the citizen.
  3. Evidence of wrongful exclusion — The very high rate of restoration among decided appeals suggests that the process may have struck off genuine voters, raising concerns about the reliability of the initial deletion exercise.
  4. Delhi parallel — The analysis also points to 24 of Delhi’s 70 seats having fewer electors in the draft rolls than the number who actually voted a year earlier, reinforcing concerns about enumeration and deletion.
Constitutional Safeguard and Way Forward
  1. Constitutional safeguard — Electoral-roll revision must preserve universal adult franchise; maintaining accurate rolls cannot justify a process where eligible citizens must prove their entitlement only after being removed.
  2. Independent institutional credibility — The controversy over the composition of the mechanism for selecting the Election Commission leadership has also raised concerns regarding the “perception test” and public confidence in electoral institutions.
  3. Audit before deletion — Given the scale of discrepancies and subsequent restorations, the electoral-roll database should be audited before further deletions are undertaken.
  4. Reverse the burden — The core principle should be that the State establishes ineligibility rather than presuming it, with verification and meaningful opportunity preceding exclusion wherever possible.

2. Trading Smart: India–New Zealand FTA

The India–New Zealand FTA, expected to come into force on October 20, illustrates how agreements with smaller trading partners can complement India’s larger trade negotiations. Although bilateral trade of about $1.1 billion is less than 1% of India’s total goods trade, the agreement can provide alternative markets and trade routes, especially for MSME exporters, amid tariff and trade-route uncertainties.

  1. Diversifying trade opportunities — The agreement provides duty-free access for 100% of India’s exports, creating an additional market for Indian exporters. With textiles (~14%) and pearls and semi-precious stones (~5%) forming important labour-intensive exports, the deal can particularly benefit employment-intensive sectors.
  2. Balanced export basket — India’s exports also include capital-intensive products such as pharmaceuticals, nuclear-reactor parts, vehicles, mineral fuels, electrical machinery and iron & steel, giving the FTA a relatively broad sectoral base.
  3. MSME resilience — Nearly half of India’s exporters are micro, small and medium enterprises. Alternative markets can help them mitigate disruptions arising from tariffs or closure of trade routes through rerouting of exports.
  4. Strategic concessions — India secured useful outcomes on labour mobility, including visa-related concessions for workers and students, while sensitive sectors were protected: nearly 30% of India’s imports from New Zealand remain outside tariff concessions.
  5. Investment and external balance — New Zealand has committed to facilitate around $20 billion of investment in India over 15 years, adding an investment dimension to the trade relationship.
  6. Complementing big trade deals — With 100% U.S. tariffs looming and the Washington trade deal remaining elusive, smaller agreements can provide India with alternative export channels and strengthen its negotiating leverage.
  7. Larger lesson — India’s growing international economic heft can be used to negotiate targeted agreements with smaller partners, combining market access, investment and mobility while protecting sensitive sectors.

The Indian Express Gist - 24th September, 2026

1 . Tulu’s ‘Official’ Tag in Karnataka: What It Means

Karnataka has decided to accord Tulu the status of a secondary and additional administrative language in the coastal districts of Dakshina Kannada and Udupi. The move seeks to recognise the region’s linguistic and cultural heritage while facilitating greater use of Tulu in administration.

Tulu: Linguistic and Cultural Significance
  1. Dravidian language — Tulu is one of the five Dravidian languages mentioned here, alongside Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam. It is spoken mainly in coastal Karnataka and parts of northern Kerala.
  2. Distinct cultural identity — Tulu has its own script, although it is now largely written using the Kannada script. It is closely associated with the cultural traditions of coastal Karnataka, including Bhoota Kola and other local practices.
  3. Significant speaker base — Despite migration of Tulu-speaking people to cities such as Mumbai and Bengaluru, around 8–2 million people are native speakers.
What the Recognition Provides?
  1. Administrative use — Government offices in Dakshina Kannada and Udupi can now use Tulu for official communication alongside Kannada.
  2. Implementation support — The State Cabinet has sanctioned ₹82 lakh every year for translation, training and related activities to facilitate the use of Tulu in government offices.
  3. Long-standing demand — The demand for recognition has been raised in the Karnataka legislature for years. Supporters have argued that Tulu was not granted separate linguistic status during the 1956 reorganisation of States, unlike some other Dravidian languages.
  4. Cultural recognition — Tulu-speaking communities have sought greater recognition of their linguistic heritage, arguing that its substantial speaker base and cultural depth warrant institutional recognition.
Challenges and Significance
  1. Limited institutional penetration — Although the decision allows Tulu in education, signage and cultural promotion, only a few signs in the region are currently in Tulu. A major challenge is that relatively few people know the Tulu script, while the language is also not widely taught in schools and colleges.
  2. Preservation through use — Recognition alone may not ensure preservation; wider use in education, administration and public spaces is necessary for the language to remain accessible to younger generations.
  3. Cultural heritage and governance — The move represents an attempt to connect administrative recognition with cultural heritage and local identity, particularly in a region where Tulu-speaking communities have long sought greater recognition.

2. EC Appointment: Why the Supreme Court Placed the Matter Before a Constitution Bench

The Supreme Court is examining the constitutional validity of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, which replaced the earlier selection mechanism and excluded the Chief Justice of India (CJI) from the selection committee.

From Anoop Baranwal to the 2023 Law
  1. Article 324(2) — The Constitution provides for appointment of the CEC and other ECs by the President, subject to any law made by Parliament. For 73 years, Parliament had not enacted such a law and appointments operated through the executive framework.
  2. Anoop Baranwal judgment (2023) — The Supreme Court held that, until Parliament made a law, appointments should be made on the recommendation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition and CJI, reflecting the need for an independent election process.
  3. 2023 statutory change — Parliament subsequently enacted the 2023 law, replacing the CJI in the three-member committee with a Union Cabinet Minister, resulting in a panel comprising the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition and Union Cabinet Minister.
Why Independence of the EC Matters?
  1. Institutional neutrality — The Election Commission administers the electoral process, including electoral rolls and elections involving competing political actors. Hence, those entrusted with elections must be “insulated from executive influence”.
  2. Independence vs accountability — The issue is not simply whether the executive has a role in appointments, but whether the overall composition of the selection mechanism creates adequate checks, neutrality and public confidence.
  3. Perception of independence — Even where formal powers are preserved, the composition of the appointing body matters for the perceived neutrality of a constitutional institution.
  4. Separation of powers — The case also raises a broader question: how should Parliament’s power to legislate under Article 324 be balanced against judicially recognised principles protecting institutional independence?
Why a Constitution Bench?
  1. Substantial constitutional question — Under Article 145(3), a Constitution Bench is required where a case involves a substantial question concerning interpretation of the Constitution. The disagreement is whether the 2023 law is already governed by the constitutional principle laid down in Anoop Baranwal or raises a fresh constitutional question.
  2. Split verdict — One view holds that the earlier judgment has already settled the principle against exclusive executive control; the other considers the specific question of whether a neutral/independent member is constitutionally mandatory to be unsettled.
  3. Broader constitutional significance — The case therefore goes beyond the composition of one committee. It concerns how India safeguards the independence, credibility and democratic legitimacy of constitutional institutions.
  4. Way forward — Any appointment framework should balance Parliamentary authority, executive accountability, opposition participation and institutional independence, so that the Election Commission enjoys both functional autonomy and public confidence.

3. Chief Election Commissioner Is Not the Election Commission of India

The concerns surrounding the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) have raised a larger institutional question: whether decisions of the Election Commission are being taken collectively and according to law, or whether the institution is functioning through unilateral decision-making.

Collective Decision-Making and Institutional Accountability
  1. Commission, not individual — Article 324 creates an Election Commission, not an institution meant to function through the unilateral decisions of its Chief. The article recalls the Supreme Court’s observation that elections are entrusted to the Commission as a whole, not to an individual.
  2. Majority principle — The 2023 EC Act provides that where the CEC and ECs differ, matters should ordinarily be decided by consensus, while Section 18(1) requires unanimity for certain matters; where unanimity fails, the majority decides. Thus, a CEC cannot simply override the statutory decision-making structure.
  3. Dissent matters — Two Election Commissioners reportedly recorded objections 14 times in 10 months, including on voter registration and deletion, restoration of names, Form 6, and control over the digital architecture of electoral rolls. This makes the issue one of institutional functioning, not merely individual disagreement.
  4. Constitutional body, statutory constraints — A constitutional authority must exercise its powers within the framework prescribed by law. Decisions taken outside the statutory decision-making process can raise questions of institutional legitimacy and accountability.
SIR and the Electoral Database
  1. Form 6 controversy — Form 6, prescribed under the Registration of Electors Rules, reportedly could not be altered merely through an SIR direction without amending the Rules. Yet an altered form appeared on the ECI’s website, with one Commissioner reportedly calling the change “unauthorised/illegal” and seeking its immediate removal.
  2. Centralisation of electoral rolls — The two Commissioners reportedly objected that access to the electoral-roll database had been centralised in Delhi, bypassing safeguards and independent technical audits. The concern is whether changes in the database were being made with adequate statutory and institutional oversight.
  3. Statutory authority of EROs — Electoral Registration Officers are the statutory authorities for voter registration, deletion and correction. The reported centralised changes therefore raise a question of whether local statutory authority was being overridden by the digital architecture.
  4. Evidence from restoration — In West Bengal, 31 lakh appeals were filed before tribunals by deleted voters seeking restoration, while another 16.10 lakh appeals were reportedly filed by the ECI challenging inclusion of other electors The high number of restoration cases strengthens concerns about the electoral-roll revision process.
Protecting the ECI’s Institutional Character
  1. Independence + collective functioning — The ECI’s independence does not mean freedom from statutory rules; rather, it requires the institution to function through lawful, collective and accountable decision-making.
  2. Audit and transparency — The concerns call for an independent technical and legal audit of the electoral-roll database, review of decisions challenged for lacking proper approval, and restoration of decisions found to have been taken without lawful authority.
  3. Form 6 and statutory compliance — The altered Form 6 should conform to the statutory Rules, while the ECI should clearly disclose the authority under which appeals and other actions are undertaken.
  4. Broader democratic principle — Electoral institutions derive legitimacy not only from their constitutional status but also from transparent adherence to their own procedures.

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