The Hindu Gist - 25th September, 2026
1 . A Nation’s Song
The debate over Vande Mataram reflects a larger constitutional balance between national symbols, freedom of religion, individual liberty and India’s pluralistic identity.
- National symbol, not majoritarian symbol — Patriotism is presented not as “reverence for a territory” but as a shared commitment to India’s diversity. National symbols and anthems are meant to bind citizens together, not become markers of majoritarian or minoritarian identity.
- Historical status — Vande Mataram became a major symbol of the freedom struggle. The Congress Working Committee in 1937 resolved that only its first two stanzas, which did not contain imagery objectionable to some communities, would be used for national purposes. In 1950, it was accorded the same honour as Jana Gana Mana.
- Freedom of conscience — The present debate raises the question of whether respect for a national song can be separated from compelled participation. The underlying constitutional tension is between collective national expression and the individual’s freedom of conscience and religion.
- Legal protection of individual liberty — The piece invokes the Supreme Court’s reasoning that standing in respectful silence cannot by itself amount to an offence, particularly where there is no disturbance or provocation. Thus, patriotism cannot automatically be converted into a legal obligation to participate in a particular manner.
- The larger principle — National symbols acquire legitimacy when they unite across differences. The constitutional idea of India’s unity therefore requires both respect for national symbols and protection of the freedom of conscience, so that national integration does not become enforced uniformity.
2. A Chance to Retreat: Greenland and U.S. Security
Why Greenland Matters?
- Strategic location — Greenland’s position in the Arctic gives it importance for S. and NATO security, particularly as competition and military activity in the Arctic increase.
- 1951 Defence Agreement — The U.S.–Denmark agreement allowed U.S. military bases in Greenland and reflected Cold War strategic concerns. Today, Greenland hosts the Pituffik Space Base, reinforcing its continuing military significance.
- Arctic resources and routes — The region’s growing strategic importance is linked to melting ice, emerging Arctic routes and access to natural resources, including rare earths. Greenland’s potential therefore has both security and economic significance.
The Greenland Agreement and the Way Forward
- Security accommodation — The agreement reportedly allows the U.S. greater access to Greenland while respecting Danish and Greenlandic sovereignty, providing a possible way to address Washington’s security concerns without changing Greenland’s constitutional status.
- NATO framework — Greenland remains within the Danish realm and therefore part of NATO, while the agreement seeks to accommodate enhanced U.S. security interests.
- Economic dimension — Denmark has already blocked Chinese investments in rare-earth resources, indicating that critical minerals and strategic supply chains are also part of the broader Arctic equation.
- Autonomy vs strategic control — Greenland’s position as a self-governing country within the Kingdom of Denmark creates a delicate balance between greater U.S. strategic access, Danish sovereignty and Greenlandic autonomy.
- Diplomatic alternative — The agreement offers a route based on negotiation rather than coercion, allowing security cooperation while avoiding a direct challenge to Greenland’s existing political and territorial arrangements.
3 . Alternatives to the SWIFT Payment System
The BRICS New Delhi Declaration sought greater use of national currencies for trade and payments. Multiple wars and the weaponisation of the dollar through financial sanctions have encouraged countries, particularly in the Global South, to explore alternatives to the Belgium-based SWIFT system for cross-border payments.
Emerging Alternatives to SWIFT
- mBridge — A multi-CBDC cross-border platform involving the central banks of Thailand, UAE, China, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia. It is designed for direct peer-to-peer CBDC transactions and reached minimum viability in 2024.
- CIPS — China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, backed by the People’s Bank of China. Launched in 2015, it enables global banks to clear cross-border yuan transactions directly onshore, reducing reliance on offshore yuan clearing hubs.
- SPFS — Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages, developed in 2014 to bypass Western sanctions. After Russian banks were cut off from SWIFT in 2022, SPFS became an important alternative.
- SEPAM — Iran’s local interbank telecommunications system; by 2023, Iranian banks and foreign banks were connecting with numerous banks through SPFS using SEPAM.
Why Alternatives Matter — and Their Limits
- Sanctions resilience — Wars and the use of financial sanctions have increased the desire for payment channels that are less vulnerable to disruption through Western financial infrastructure.
- CBDC opportunity — Linking CBDCs could facilitate cross-border payments in national currencies, though limited global adoption of digital currencies and political and technical hurdles can constrain implementation.
- Still fragmented — Unlike SWIFT’s widespread acceptance, these systems remain patchy and geographically concentrated, limiting their ability to serve as universal substitutes.
- mBridge’s progress — The BIS supported Project mBridge from 2019 and exited it in October 2024 after helping develop the platform. The project had reached minimum viability status in 2024, indicating technological progress but not yet a universal alternative.
- Larger trend — The emergence of CIPS, SPFS, SEPAM and mBridge reflects a broader movement towards diversifying international payment infrastructure and reducing dependence on a single dominant system.
The Indian Express Gist - 25th September, 2026
1 . ‘Enemy State’ in UN Charter: Why Japan Wants It Removed
Japan has renewed its demand to remove the “enemy state” clauses from the UN Charter, arguing that provisions created in the aftermath of the Second World War no longer reflect the contemporary international order. The issue also highlights the difficulty of reforming institutions built around the post-war balance of power.
What are the “Enemy State” Clauses?
- WWII legacy — The UN Charter contains references to states that were enemies of the Allied powers during the Second World War, particularly in Articles 53, 77 and 107.
- Special treatment — These provisions permit certain actions concerning former enemy states without following the normal procedures applicable to other UN members, reflecting the post-war security framework in which the Charter was drafted.
- Japan’s objection — Japan, as one of the former enemy states, argues that retaining such provisions is anachronistic after decades of its participation in the UN system and its transformation into a major contributor to the international order.
- Earlier recognition of obsolescence — The issue has been raised repeatedly by Japan and other former enemy states, while the UN General Assembly has also recognised that the clauses have become obsolete.
Why Removal Has Not Happened?
- Charter amendment required — Removing the provisions requires amendment of the UN Charter, making the process considerably more difficult than simply declaring the clauses outdated.
- Institutional inertia — The continued presence of these clauses reflects the wider difficulty of modifying institutions created in the post-World War II era, even when their original geopolitical rationale has weakened.
- UN reform connection — Japan’s demand is linked to the broader question of whether the UN’s institutional structure adequately reflects contemporary geopolitical realities, including the changing role of countries that were once classified as enemy states.
- Legal continuity vs present realities — The debate illustrates how provisions may remain formally embedded in an international treaty even after the circumstances that produced them have fundamentally changed.
2. Process to Remove the Chief Election Commissioner
The removal of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) is deliberately made difficult to protect the independence and institutional autonomy of the Election Commission. The Constitution places the CEC’s removal on a threshold comparable to that applicable to a Supreme Court judge.
Constitutional Safeguard for the CEC
- Article 324(5) — The CEC can be removed from office only “in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court”, i.e. for proved misbehaviour or incapacity.
- High threshold — A removal motion must be passed by both Houses of Parliament with the required two-thirds majority, making removal deliberately difficult and preventing removal on ordinary political disagreement.
- Presidential action — Once Parliament passes the motion, the President orders the removal, following the constitutional process.
- Other Election Commissioners — Unlike the CEC, an Election Commissioner or Regional Commissioner can be removed only on the recommendation of the CEC, providing an additional layer of protection.
How is the CEC Removed?
- Grounds for removal — The CEC can be removed only on the grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, following the same constitutional standard applicable to a Supreme Court judge.
- Notice of removal motion — A motion can be initiated in either House of Parliament. The notice must be signed by at least 100 members of the Lok Sabha or 50 members of the Rajya Sabha.
- Admission of the motion — The Speaker of the Lok Sabha or Chairman of the Rajya Sabha examines the notice and may admit or refuse to admit it. Merely obtaining the required signatures does not automatically trigger the inquiry.
- Inquiry Committee — If the motion is admitted, a three-member Inquiry Committee is constituted to investigate the charges. It comprises:
- a Supreme Court Judge,
- a Chief Justice of a High Court, and
- a distinguished jurist.
The Committee examines the allegations and determines whether misbehaviour or incapacity is proved.
- Parliamentary approval — If the Committee finds the charges proved, the motion is taken up by Parliament. Both Houses must separately pass the motion by a special majority:
- a majority of the total membership of that House, and
- a majority of at least two-thirds of members present and voting.
- President’s order — After both Houses pass the removal address in the prescribed manner, the address is presented to the President, who issues the order removing the CEC.
Why is Such Strong Protection Necessary?
- Electoral neutrality — The ECI conducts elections involving the government, opposition and competing political actors. The CEC therefore needs freedom from fear of arbitrary removal.
- Institutional independence — A government should not be able to threaten removal merely because the Commission takes a decision it dislikes.
- Constitutional accountability + security of tenure — The system creates a balance: the CEC is not immune from removal, but removal requires proved misbehaviour/incapacity and a very high parliamentary threshold.
- Public confidence — Independence of the election authority is essential for citizens and political parties to trust that elections are being administered fairly.
3 . Don’t Ask Women to Shrink, Secure Their Space
The Nirbhaya incident of 2012 exposed the vulnerability of women in public spaces and triggered nationwide demands for stronger safety measures. Yet the persistence of crimes against women shows that the issue is not simply a lack of laws, but also weak implementation, poor institutional accountability and unsafe public infrastructure. The article notes that despite legal and institutional measures, Delhi recorded 13,396 crimes against women in 2024, indicating the continuing gap between formal safeguards and women’s lived experience.
Women’s safety therefore requires moving beyond treating each incident as an isolated crime. Better policing, stronger emergency response, safer public transport, well-designed and well-lit public spaces, functioning CCTV systems and gender-sensitive urban planning are important, but so is ensuring that women can actually use public spaces without being asked to restrict their mobility. The key idea is “freedom of movement”: women should not have to stay indoors, avoid certain places or depend on others for safety; public spaces should be made safe enough that women can use them with the same freedom that men often take for granted.
