A democracy depends not only on laws made by elected representatives, but also on courts able to apply those laws without fear or favour. That independence begins, in part, with who gets appointed as a judge: and how those decisions are made.
The Collegium system has returned to public debate amid fresh questions about executive influence, the opacity of appointment decisions and the balance between consultation and independence. The immediate trigger includes a former Supreme Court judge’s account of his experience within the Collegium, followed by a response from the former Chief Justice concerned. The larger issue is institutional: can a system designed to protect judicial independence also provide enough transparency and accountability to earn public confidence?
The issue in brief
The Collegium is the judicially evolved process through which senior judges recommend appointments to the higher judiciary. Supporters regard it as a safeguard against political control. Critics question its limited public explanation, internal concentration of power and lack of a formal, publicly accountable selection framework.
Recent statements have intensified these concerns, but they must be read carefully. An individual account of discussions inside the Collegium is an allegation or recollection: not a court finding. A former CJI’s response is an institutional perspective: not a judicial determination. And observations made by a judge in a separate case should not be treated as a final ruling on the constitutionality of the Collegium.
This article examines the constitutional background, the current controversy, the legal status of the system, its democratic stakes and practical reforms.
How the Collegium system developed
The Constitution does not expressly establish a Collegium. Articles 124 and 217 provide for the appointment of Supreme Court and High Court judges by the President, following consultation with specified constitutional authorities. The meaning of “consultation” evolved through Supreme Court judgments.
Article 124 deals with the Supreme Court of India. It provides for the Court’s composition and the appointment of its judges by the President. It also sets out qualifications for appointment and rules on matters such as resignation and removal.
Article 217 deals with the High Courts. It provides for the appointment of High Court judges by the President, following consultation with specified authorities, and covers their term of office and related conditions.
In the collegium debate, these articles matter because they provide the constitutional framework for appointing judges. The Collegium itself developed through Supreme Court judgments interpreting the appointment process. The Constitution’s original wording has also been affected by amendments and court decisions, including the 2015 decision that struck down the NJAC amendments.
In the Second Judges Case (1993), the Supreme Court gave primacy to the Chief Justice of India’s opinion in judicial appointments, provided it was formed through consultation with senior judges. The Third Judges Case (1998) clarified the consultation process and expanded the group of judges whose views the CJI was required to consider. This framework became known as the Collegium system. pib.gov.in
At the Supreme Court level, the Collegium consists of the CJI and four senior-most judges. High Court appointments begin with the High Court Collegium and proceed through the state government, the Union government and the Supreme Court Collegium before a formal appointment is made.
Principle: The system’s central purpose is to reduce the risk that the executive can select judges who may later hear cases involving the government.
Risk: A system created through judicial interpretation, rather than a detailed constitutional or statutory selection code, can leave important procedures unclear to the public.
The NJAC judgment and the continuing debate
In 2014, Parliament enacted the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, creating a commission that included judicial, executive and nominated members. In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down both measures. The majority held that the arrangements threatened judicial independence, a feature of the Constitution’s basic structure. The judgment restored the Collegium framework, while acknowledging the need to improve it.
The ruling did not declare the Collegium flawless. Nor did it settle every question about how recommendations should be assessed, how long appointments may be delayed, or how much reasoning should be made public. The Court invited suggestions for improving the process, leaving reform as a continuing institutional challenge.
Safeguard: The NJAC judgment established that judicial independence constrains the design of the appointment process.
Limit: It should not be read as a finding that every Collegium decision is beyond scrutiny or that no reform is constitutionally possible.
The latest controversy of Judicial Appointments in India: allegations, responses and recorded facts
In October 2026, media reports on former Supreme Court judge Sanjay Kishan Kaul’s forthcoming memoir renewed debate about the Collegium’s interactions with the government. Kaul reportedly questioned former CJI D.Y. Chandrachud’s approach to executive engagement in a meeting concerning Supreme Court vacancies. His account raised the broader concern that seeking the government’s view before the Collegium has formally deliberated could risk giving the executive an early influence over judicial selection. India News
These claims must be treated as Kaul’s reported account, not as established findings. Chandrachud said he had not read the memoir and therefore could not respond to its details. He also said that Collegium decisions were unanimous, that Kaul had endorsed the recommendations, and that he did not recall Kaul walking out of a meeting. He described the meetings as respectful and reasoned. Legal News – The Indian Express
The Supreme Court’s published records can help establish what was formally recorded, but they cannot by themselves resolve every difference in recollection about informal conversations. The dispute therefore raises questions about the role of informal consultation and the value of clear, published procedures.
A separate concern had been raised earlier in 2026 by Supreme Court judge Ujjal Bhuyan, who questioned the absence of reasons in recent Collegium recommendations. He argued that brief explanations can help the public understand why candidates are considered suitable and recognise the work of deserving judges. His remarks were a judge’s public criticism of the process: not a court ruling that the recommendations were legally invalid. newindianexpress.com
Careful framing
- Verified fact: The Supreme Court publishes Collegium statements and resolutions, and the content and detail of those publications have varied.
- Allegation or recollection: Kaul’s account concerns how particular conversations and decisions unfolded.
- Institutional response: Chandrachud disputed aspects of the account and pointed to unanimity in formal records.
- Not established: The reported memoir claims have not, on the information available, been adjudicated as findings of fact by a court.
What the courts have: and have not: decided
The Collegium’s constitutional foundation remains the Second and Third Judges Cases, read alongside the 2015 NJAC judgment. No recent judgment has displaced that framework.
A separate development in September 2026 has sometimes been discussed alongside the Collegium debate. In a split decision concerning challenges to the law on appointments of Election Commissioners, Justice Dipankar Datta criticised selective executive clearance of judicial recommendations and commented on the executive’s role in judicial appointments. The case concerned the Election Commission appointment law and whether its challenge should be referred to a larger Bench; it was not a fresh judgment deciding the validity of the Collegium system. The observations should therefore not be presented as a new binding ruling on the Collegium’s constitutional status. indianexpress.com
The distinction matters. A judge’s observations in a case may contribute to public and legal debate, but the legal effect of a judgment depends on the issue before the Court, the decision reached and the reasoning necessary to that decision. The Collegium remains the operative system unless the Supreme Court or a constitutional amendment validly changes the framework.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court Collegium recommended three High Court Chief Justices for appointment to the Supreme Court on 28 September 2026. The Union government notified their appointments on 5 October. This shows that recommendations and executive notification continue to function within the existing process; it does not by itself settle arguments about the process’s transparency or accountability. India
The case for judicial independence
Judicial appointments involve a difficult constitutional balance. If the government has decisive control over who becomes a judge, candidates may be perceived as indebted to the political executive. This could weaken public confidence in courts, especially when cases involve government action.
The Collegium’s defenders argue that judges are better placed to assess legal ability, temperament and professional integrity. They also note that the executive and state governments participate in the process through background inputs and formal stages. The Supreme Court has published information about the appointment process and proposals approved for High Court appointments, including certain candidate and appointment details. India
Yet judicial independence does not mean that judges should be free from all public explanation. Independence protects decision-making from improper pressure; it does not require institutional secrecy about selection criteria or procedure.
The case for transparency and accountability
A system can protect independence and still face legitimate scrutiny. When reasons are sparse, the public may be unable to understand how merit, seniority, representation, regional balance and integrity were weighed. This can invite speculation, weaken trust and leave candidates without a clear account of the process.
At the same time, full disclosure of every confidential input could unfairly harm candidates or compromise security checks. Transparency must therefore be designed with care. The objective should be to disclose meaningful reasons and process safeguards while protecting genuinely sensitive information.
Risk: Limited explanations may make sound decisions appear arbitrary.
Safeguard: Publish clear selection criteria, procedural steps and concise reasons, with narrow protections for confidential material.
Principle: Accountability should illuminate the process without turning judicial appointments into political contests.
A comparison between India’s Collegium System and major global judicial appointment models highlights how different democracies balance judicial independence, executive accountability, and transparency:
Comparative Matrix: Global Judicial Appointment Models
| Feature / Dimension | India (Collegium System) | United Kingdom (JAC Framework) | United States (Executive & Legislative) | South Africa (Judicial Service Commission) |
| Primary Selection Authority | Judiciary-Dominated Collegium (CJI + 4 senior-most judges for SC). | Independent Commission (Judicial Appointments Commission — JAC). | Executive Nomination (U.S. President) with Legislative oversight. | Multi-Stakeholder Commission (Judicial Service Commission — JSC). |
| Composition of Recommending Body | 100% Judicial: CJI and senior SC/HC judges (No civil society or political members). | Mixed & Lay Majority: 15 members comprising judges, legal practitioners, lay members, and a non-lawyer Chair. | No formal board: President consults advisors/DOJ/ABA; Senate Judiciary Committee conducts public hearings. | Broadly Representative: ~25 members (Judges, lawyers, law professors, MPs, Minister of Justice). |
| Role of the Executive | Limited/Reactive: Government performs background checks; can seek reconsideration once, but recommendations are binding if reiterated. | Formal/Veto-Limited: Lord Chancellor (Minister) can accept, reject, or request reconsideration on specific statutory grounds. | Primary / Decisive: The President nominates all federal judges. | Final Appointment: President appoints based on JSC recommendations (with specific consultation duties). |
| Role of the Legislature | None: Parliament has no direct oversight or confirmation role. | Minimal: Informal scrutiny; Lord Chancellor is accountable to Parliament. | Decisive Confirmation: U.S. Senate confirms nominees via simple majority vote. | Indirect Scrutiny: Representatives from the National Assembly and Council of Provinces sit on the JSC. |
| Transparency & Merit Standards | Low to Moderate: Brief resolutions published; no open hearings, interviews, or published candidate rankings. | High: Objective merit criteria, merit-based open applications, interviews, and published selection guidelines. | High (Public Scrutiny): Public Senate Judiciary Committee hearings broadcast live. | High: Open public interviews broadcast live, transparent criteria, statutory diversity mandates. |
| Primary Risk or Criticism | Lack of public transparency, perceived opacity, favoritism, and delay in clearances. | Potential for technocratic rigidity or administrative delays. | High political polarization and partisan ideological packing. | Risk of political posturing during live public interviews. |
Bridging Global Best Practices and Pragmatic Reforms for Judicial Appointments
The current debate in India is not about choosing between total judicial autonomy and complete executive oversight, but rather finding an institutional equilibrium where judicial independence and public transparency reinforce each other.
Synthesized Policy Roadmap
- Transparency & Objective Standards
- Global Precedent: The UK’s Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) relies on open, merit-based application processes and publicly documented selection criteria.
- Proposed Reform:
- Publish Appointment Protocols: Formally codify the stages, roles, standards, and expected timelines for High Court and Supreme Court elevations.
- Concise Reasoned Resolutions: Issue brief, structured explanations detailing how merit, seniority, legal competence, regional balance, and institutional needs were weighed—while preserving candidate privacy on sensitive background checks.
- Institutionalizing Accountability & Handling Disagreements
- Global Precedent: In South Africa (JSC) and the UK, executive input and objections are subject to formal, structured recording rather than informal delays or opaque rejections.
- Proposed Reform:
- Written Record of Executive Objections: Require the Union Government to document any objections, returns, or requests for reconsideration in writing within a specified period.
- Strict Statutory Timelines: Enforce clear deadlines for both the Collegium and the Executive to minimize judicial vacancies and remove arbitrary delays.
- Diversity, Merit Review, and Public Trust
- Global Precedent: Multi-stakeholder models (such as South Africa’s JSC) explicitly integrate representation and public vetting into candidate evaluation.
- Proposed Reform:
- Aggregate Diversity Reporting: Publish periodic data on demographic representation, practice backgrounds (e.g., trial bench vs. bar), and integrity assessment criteria.
- Periodic Process Audits: Establish structured, non-intrusive periodic reviews of administrative workflows to identify systemic bottlenecks without compromising judicial independence in individual selections.
Key Takeaway for Governance & Constitutional Design
Core Principle: True judicial independence is not shielded by secrecy; it is fortified by credibility. By transitioning from opaque informal consultations to structured, reasoned, and time-bound procedures, India can preserve the core safeguard of the basic structure while earning enduring public confidence.
Conclusion: independence needs public trust
The Collegium system was developed to protect the judiciary from excessive political influence. That purpose remains constitutionally important. But independence is strongest when the public can also see that appointments follow consistent standards, that disagreements are handled through defined procedures and that decisions receive an adequate explanation.
The present controversy does not, by itself, prove that any appointment was improperly made. It does show why a process that relies on both formal records and confidential deliberation needs clearer safeguards. The answer is neither unchecked executive control nor unexamined judicial discretion. It is a transparent, time-bound and reasoned process that preserves judicial independence while making institutional responsibility visible.
Concluding principle: An independent judiciary must be protected from political pressure: and its appointment process must be credible enough to command public confidence.
Data compilation related to Judicial Appointments in India
| Item | Key detail |
| Constitutional provisions | Articles 124 and 217 concern appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts |
| Collegium’s origin | Second Judges Case (1993); clarified in the Third Judges Case (1998) |
| NJAC | Enacted through the 99th Constitutional Amendment and NJAC Act; struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015 |
| Current controversy | Kaul’s reported account of Collegium-government interactions; Chandrachud’s response disputes aspects of it |
| Transparency concern | Justice Ujjal Bhuyan questioned the lack of reasons in recent recommendations |
| September 2026 court development | Justice Dipankar Datta’s observations came in an Election Commission appointments case; they did not decide the Collegium’s validity |
| Recent appointments | Three Supreme Court appointments recommended on 28 September and notified on 5 October 2026 |
UPSC perspective regarding Judicial Appointments in India
This issue is relevant to GS Paper II: Constitution, separation of powers, judiciary and governance. It can be linked to judicial independence, the basic structure doctrine, checks and balances, transparency, accountability and representation in constitutional institutions.
A balanced answer should distinguish the Collegium’s legal status from criticism of its functioning. It should also separate allegations, official responses, judicial observations and binding holdings. A strong conclusion can support reforms that improve transparency and timeliness while preserving the judiciary’s independence from political control.
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